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THE INDONESIAN MAOISTS: DOCTRINES
AND PERSPECTIVES
JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF
In the aftermath of the abortive coup attempt of September 30,
1965 (usually called Gestapu by acronym-minded Indonesians,
from Gerakan Tiga Puluh September or "Thirty September
Movement"), which occurred mainly in Djakarta and Central
Java, and in which elements of the Indonesian armed forces led
by "progressive" officers as well as some national and provincial
leaders and units of youth and women's front groups of the
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI)
were involved, there emerged a distinctive group of Maoistoriented Indonesian Communists. Perhaps two hundred of the
group reside outside Indonesia, principally in Tirana and Peking;
these non-residents include students, former cousular and diplomatic personnel (like former Indonesian ambassador to the
People's Republic of China, Djawoto), journalists and other
professionals. In Indonesia itself, where the PKI has been
formally banned since 1966, there are several scores of additional
underground supporters, some of whom have seen active guerilla
service in the Maoist-oriented, predominantly Chinese "North
Kalimantan People's Guerilla Forces" (NKPGF) that operates in
the interior of the Malaysian state of Sarawak near the border of
Indonesian West Kalimantan (Borneo). 1 Over the years, Peking
has harbored a "Delegation of the Central Committee" of the PKI,
headed by Jusuf Adjirorop, a pre-Gestapu Politburo member of the
PKI, and as Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations remain suspended (though not formally broken), Chinese media continue to
give space to official pronouncements of the PKI's based
"Delegation." Such pronouncements, not surprisingly, urge party
members (as the most recent PKI anniversary message has it) to
"truly master the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung
Thought" and denounce the "splittist activities of the Soviet
social-imperialists." 2
Numerically, the Indonesian Maoists, to a large degree an
expatriate group at that, would hardly seem to merit much
consideration. Moreover, in Moscow, India and Sri Lanka there
1. See the biographical sketches of NKPGF members in the Sarawak Tribune
(Kuching) March, 10, 1975.
2. "Continue to Hold Aloft the Banner of Revolution and Strive to Realize
National Liberation," Peking Review, May 30, 1975, pp. 17-18.
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are several scores of pro-Soviet PKI exiles and/or sympathizers,
who have published their particular version of Gestapu and of the
misfortunes that have befallen their party. 3 However, while
Indonesia's Suharto government has thus far been reluctant to
join the accelerating momentum now evident among other
Southeast Asian nations in seeking a new modus vivendi with
Peking, that momentum itself and the place of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) generally in the new post-Vietnam war
constellation of Asian internal relations, as well as the persisting
domestic opposition in Indonesia from the various shades of the
presently contained, underground, dormant and intimidated
Indonesian Left (eventually again to be reckoned with, surely, in
Indonesian politics) suggest that the views of Indonesian Maoists
need to be better understood. Analyzing their publications, and
insofar as identifiable, their distinctive tactics during the past
decade, indicates perhaps three nodal areas of Indonesian Maoist
concern. The first is the historic course of the Indonesian state
and the role of the PKI in it, and particularly in relation to the
Gestapu incident. Second, there is the condition of Indonesia
today under the Suharto regime, and that regime's foreign
relations. Finally, there are the present tasks of the PKI both
organizationally and tactically, in furthering the nation along the
Maoists' self-perceived revolutionary road.
I.
Four major periods of "white terror" (i.e., anti-Communist
persecution) in a country that remains essentially locked in semifeudal conditions, aggravated by imperialistic domination- such
is the Indonesian Maoist's perception of his national history in
the past half-century.

The first "white terror" was that of the Dutch colonial rulers
of Indonesia; in November 1926, at the time of the PKI's first
3. For the views of the pro-Soviet PKI group see To Brothers at Home and
Comrades Abroad Fighting Against Imperialism, For Independence, Peace,
Democracy and Socialism For a Sound Indonesian Revolution (Tribune Publications, Columbo, 1967); "Lessons from the Set-Back in Indonesia," Political Affairs
(CPUSA Theoretical Journal) March, 1968, pp. 49-61; "Urgent Tasks of the
Communist Movement in Indonesia," Information Bulletin (Prague), 1969, no. 7
(143), pp. 23-42; Thomas Sinuradja, "The Struggle for Unity. A Few Lessons from
the History of the CP of Indonesia," World Marxist Review, September, 1973, pp.
35-37.
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armed rebellion against them, the Dutch rulers crushed this first
Indonesian "national armed uprising." Then, in 1948, in the midst
of the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch, a "reactionary"
Indonesian government headed by premier Muhammad Hatta
and acting "in collusion with the US imperialists," launched a
second "barbarous white terror" against the party. This occurred,
it might be added, after a handful of lesser party leaders had
staged an abortive coup in the East Java city of Madiun. The coup
attempt illustrated the party's doctrinal and tactical errors during
the Indonesian Revolution, the Maoists hold. Shattered, though
not formally outlawed, after Madiun, the party had to experience
a third "white terror" of arrest and persecution in 1951 during the
period when a now independent Indonesian Republic was
governed by a cabinet headed by the conservative Muslim premier
Sukiman. (This third "white terror" came after ill-considered
Communist labor agitation and strike action in and around
Djakarta.) However, these blows, too, the national party survived,
according to this Maoist version of Indonesian history, just as
regional PKI organizations were able to overcome, in subsequent
years, various localized forms of "white terror", unleashed by
"demestic reactionaries" such as militant Muslim extremists in
West Java and anti-Sukamo and anti-Communist military
commanders and political leaders who proclaimed a secessionist
counter-government in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes) in
1958. Yet the PKI could not be annihilated, and, during the fifties
and sixties, was able to develop in a "period of relatively peaceful
struggle" in a country that had remained "long enough" both
"semi-independent and semi-feudal." This comparatively "peaceful" period of PKI growth, it might be added, coincided with the
last and most authoritarian phase of President Sukamo's "Guided
Democracy" rule over Indonesia. But it was also a period, as
Indonesian Maoist history now holds, when "modem revisionism," specifically the policy of achieving socialism peacefully, and
other forms of "petty bourgeois subjectivism" became dominant in
the PKI. And thus the stage was set for the disaster that was to
overtake the party with and in the aftermath of the 1965 Gestapu
affair, when "right wing forces" headed by a "clique of generals"
unleashed a fourth "white terror" (or, as some Maoist accounts
have it, the third "white terror" since Indonesians proclaimed
their independence on August 17, 1945) against the PKI,
establishing for the moment a temporarily "superior position in
comparison with the people's forces." But the struggle goes on,
and the PKI will undoubtedly ultimately succeed in bringing the
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Indonesian people to a time when there will be no "oppression by
imperialism and feudal vestiges." 4
Perhaps the most striking feature in this Indonesian Maoists'
version of their nation's recent history is not just that the march
of events is made to pivot primarily on certain distinctive periods
in which the PKI was persecuted or impeded by an antiCommunist "white terror." Rather, it is the deepening emphasis
over the years, in the Maoists' literature on that history, that the
party basically misunderstood the nature and aftermath of the
Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch (the "August 1945
Revolution," as it is commonly called) so that the succession of
"white terrors" experienced by the party since the 1948 Madiun
rebellion acquire a kind of historical inevitability. In a collection
of five principal statements published by the Indonesian Maoists
in September 1971, this progression in emphasis is particularly
apparent. 5 In the first statement, a May 1966 party anniversary
message, presumably issued in Djokjakarta, Central Java by the
party's Politburo, little more is said about PKI errors save a
passing reference to the fact that during a "relatively peaceful"
period of party struggle (presumably in the later fifties and
sixties) the emergence of "revisionism" was facilitated. The
second statement in the same collection, issued by the Politburo
on August 17, 1966, the twenty-first anniversary of the outbreak of
the Indonesian Revolution, offers a new doctrinal focus, however,
namely the alleged "failure" of the August 1945 revolution, and
the errors in the PKI party line in relation to it. This failure of the
August 1945 Revolution is described initially in terms of the
dissimilar political interests of the social classes in Indonesia
participating in the anti-colonial struggle. The August 1945
Revolution, occurring in a period of the decline of capitalism, was
therefore not "an old-type bourgeois democratic revolution,"
according to this August 17, 1966 statement, but, since its motive
force was the proletariat and the peasantry, the revolution was
part of the "anti-imperialist" and "world Proletarian socialist
4. The above description and citations are drawn from "Let Us Keep the
Flames of 1945 August Revolution Ablaze - Punish and Smash the Traitors,"
Indonesian Tribune (Tirana) vol. 8, 1974, no. 3, pp. 3-4, and "Hold Aloft the
Reputation and Honour of the Communist" (May 23, 1966 PKI Politburo Message)
pp. 3-12 in Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's
Democratic Revolution in Indonesia. Five Important Documents of the Political
Bureau of the CC PKI (published by the Delegation of the CC PKI, Tirana, 1971).
Indonesian Tribune is the Indonesian Maoists' bi-monthly and principal journal.
5. Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line ... , op. cit.
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revolution" now sweeping the world. Nevertheless, the "exploiting" classes, particularly the national bourgeoisie, checked the
further progress of the August 1945 Revolution once that
revolution had satisfied the bourgeoisie's own interests, as
meanwhile the PKI suffering from "serious weakness in theory"
and lack of understanding of the "concrete conditions" not only
failed to lead consistently the armed struggle against the Dutch,
but also "did not develop guerilla warfare that was integrated
with the democratic movement of the peasants." Indeed, the PKI,
according to the Maoist view, underplayed such strength as it had
in order to be able to cooperate with the "Right wing Socialists"
led by premier Sutan Sjahrir and with the national bourgeoisie,
thus failing to reach its own "objective goal." 6
This general perception of the August 1945 Revolution as a
potentially promising proletarian uprising that eventually went
off the rails because it came under the control of the national
Indonesian bourgeoisie and "Right wing Socialist" elements with
which the PKI erroneously attempted to cooperate, has been given
its fullest refinement to date in the Indonesian Maoists' literature
in the third document included in their abovementioned collection
of five principal party statements. This third document is the socalled otokritik (self-criticism) of the party's Politburo, issued
presumably from somewhere in "Central Java" in September
1966. 7 The otokritik, the original authorship of which has been
attributed to Sudisman, a prominent Politburo member who was
subsequently arrested and executed, is an open attack on the
theories of PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, who, from the early fifties
until the 1965 debacle of Gestapu, led the PKI to the greatest
expansion and influence in its history. Aidit was also killed in
Gestapu's aftermath.
Elaborating on the theme of the "embourgeoisement" of the
August 1945 Revolution, and on the failure of the party to realize
the Indonesian Revolution's "proletarian" goals, the otokritik
proceeds to extend the failure of the August 1945 Revolution to the
settlement with the Dutch that ended the revolution and in fact to
the entire first decade and a half of Indonesia's formal national
independence (1950-65) as well. The major accent in the otokritik,
6. Cf. especially ''Take the Road of Revolution to Realize the Tasks Which
Should Have Been Accomplished by the 1945 August Revolution," pp. 27-84, in
Build the PKI Awng the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit.
7. The otokritik's title is the same as the title of the collection of five
important statements in which it appears: Build the PKI Awng the MarxistLeninist Line, op. cit., pp. 148-9.
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however, falls not just on the machinations of the vacillating
national bourgeoisie and its "reactionary" allies, but more
especially on a cardinal doctrinal error, attributed to Aidit, which
doomed the party to disaster and which also had already been
mentioned, but very briefly, in the August 17, 1966 statement cited
above. That doctrinal error is the "theory of two aspects in the
state power" of the Indonesian Republic. According to this theory,
there was a "people" (or "pro-people") aspect, and an "antipeople" aspect in the political dynamics of the Indonesian
Republic during the 1950-65 period. Aidit and the PKI leadership
are accused in the otokritik of merging the party's line and its
interests wholly with this so-called "people aspect," even though
the "people aspect" of state power was, according to the Maoist
view today, in fact at that time dominated by the untrustworthy
national bourgeoisie with which the PKI and the proletariat had
allied itself just as they had done through much of the August
1945 Revolution. Content to do battle against "the Right wing
forces or the diehards," i.e., the "anti-people" aspect of state
power, under a party leadership mired in "opportunism" and one
that erroneously believed that the "people aspect" of the state
power had now become ascendant under the progressive policies
of President Sukamo, the PKI was essentially emasculated
through this cooperation not only with the national bourgeoisie
but in effect, also through its identification with Sukamo. As the
otokritik puts it:
The Party leadership went so far as to accept without any
struggle the recognition of Bung Kamo (i.e. Sukamo) as the
Great Leader of the Revolution and the leader of the "people
aspect" in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia. In the
articles and speeches of the party leaders it was frequently
said that the struggle of the PKI was based not only on
Marxism-Leninist, but also on the "teachings of Bung
Kamo" that the PKI made rapid progress because it realised
Bung Kamo's idea of Nasakom unity (i.e. the unity of
nationalist, religious and Communist political forces in
Indonesia). Even the people's democratic system in Indonesia
was said to be in conformity with Bung Kamo's main ideas
... Thus the Party leadership did not educate the working
class and the rest of the working people on the necessity to
place the leadership of the revolution in the hands of the
proletariat and their Party, namely the PKI. 8
8. Build the PKI

Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
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In briefly considering this interpretation of Aidit's twoaspects concept, one is struck first of all by the irony of the fact
that the citations in the otokritik to that part of Aidit's writings in
which Aidit expounds his two-aspect theory must, at least at one
time, have been acceptable to Maoist purists in People's China
itself, for these citations are to a collection of Aidit's writings
which consists largely of addresses given to various audiences in
the People's Republic of China during Aidit's visit there in
September, 1963. 9 For example, Aidit's elaboration of his twoaspects theory which the Indonesian Maoists now find so
displeasing, appears, nota bene, in a lecture by Aidit on the
subject of the historic course of the Indonesian revolution and on
the tasks of the PKI related to it, delivered to the Higher Party
School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China on September 2, 1963. 10 To cap the irony, this particular
report, along with Aidit's addresses to a mass rally in Peking on
September 4, 1963, and one to the Kwantung Provincial Committee Party School in Canton on September 25, 1963, in all of which
he authoritatively expounds the concept of the "people" (or
"Popular") and "antipeople" ("anti-popular") aspect of state
power in Indonesia (the latter representing the "interests of
imperialism, the compradors, landlords and bureaucrat capitalists"), appear in an English language translation published by the
Foreign Languages Press of Peking .11
Moreover the otokritik does less than justice to Aidit's own
ambiguities in his exposition of the two-aspects theory. For
example, in his September 2, 1963, report to the Chinese Central
Committee's Higher Party School, Aidit declares that "today" the
people or "popular" aspect of state power has become "the main
aspect and plays a leading role in the state power" of the
Indonesian Republic, while two days later, in his Peking mass
rally speech, Aidit asserts that the "anti-popular aspect" of
9. D.N. Aidit, Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi (Jajasan Pembaruan,
Djakarta, 1964). Included also are two addresses given in Pyongyang on
September 11 and 12, 1963.
10. Compare, e.g., Aidit's Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi, op. cit., pp. 35-37,
with Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 130-132.
11. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the
Communist Party of Indonesia (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1964).
Interestingly, the otokritik does not cite the English title of this Peking edition of
Aidit's addresses but instead uses an English translation of the Indonesian title
Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi, i.e., "Raise High the Banner of Revolution" (see
Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 206-208, notes 11, 14,
18, 21, 28, 31, 33).
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imperialists compradors, landlords, and so on, not only have been
attempting to frustrate the "progressive policies" but "up to the
present this aspect still occupies a dominant position," and hence,
the PKI's task is to struggle in such ways as to enable the
"popular aspect" to grow so that it can, in fact, achieve a
dominant position. 1 2
Then, too, the otokritik, and the position of the Indonesian
Maoists generally, by implication distort Aidit's appreciation of
the value of armed struggle and guerilla war. In the Maoists'
writings, Aidit is made out to be the architect of the "revisionist"
line of achieving power by parliamentary means. Yet it was Aidit,
in his mass rally speech at Peking on September 4, 1963, who
declared that "The August Revolution also taught us that armed
struggle is the most important struggle in the revolution," and on
the same occasion sketched the tactics which would "ensure the
victory of guerilla warfare in an island country like Indonesia." 13
The otokritik also stresses the significance in the course of the
August 1945 Revolution of a new party policy resolution, entitled
Djalan Baru untuk Republik Indonesia ("The New Road for the
Indonesian Republic"), formulated by the veteran Indonesian
Communist leader Musso when he returned to Indonesia in 1948.
Ironically, again, considering the Maoists' praise for Musso today,
Musso had spent his time mostly in the USSR since he had left
Indonesia nearly twenty-five years previously. The Djalan Baru
resolution, with its stress on achieving for the PKI a position of
leadership in the Indonesian revolution and in the national front,
and on seeing that revolution as a "national" or "bourgeois
democratic" one with prominent accommodation to be given to
both bourgeois capitalist and peasant interests, has been
desc:dbed as "Maoist in nature, if not conciously" "in its
inspiration," at least "sufficiently similar to the Chinese line." 14
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to eliminate Moscow's hand in
Musso's return or in his proposed new tactic. As it was, Musso's
approach, though formally adopted by the PKI's Politburo in
12. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the
Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 42 and 85, and Aidit, Kibarkan Tinggi
Pandji Revolusi, op. cit., pp. 36 and 68-69.
13. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the
Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 66 and 69, and D.N. Aidit, Kibarkan
Tinggi Pandji Revolusi op. cit., pp. 54, 56-57.
14. Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution (Modern
Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1957),
p. 66.
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August 1948, came to naught because of the precipitate Communist rebellion in Madiun a few weeks later (which Musso almost
certainly opposed.) The point is that the otokritik, by creating the
impression that the PKI under Aidit somehow strayed from the
norms set earlier by the Djalan Baru resolution, patently ignores
again not only the continuation of many Djalan Baru concepts in
party ideology and tactics later employed by Aidit in the 1950's
(e.g., the supportive roles of peasantry and bourgeoisie in the
revolutionary struggle, and the concept of "bourgeois democratic
revolution"), but also the explicit approval given by Aidit of
Musso's ideas and of the Djalan Baru resolution itself, which,
becoming the basis of the PKI's "new policy," according to Aidit,
"made possible the development of a new upward momentum in
the Indonesian Revolution." 15
The position of the otokritik then, and of the Maoists
generally, on the alleged extended "failures" of the August
Revolution into the 1950's and early 1960's as a result of a party
line adverse to militancy, confrontation and armed struggle, and
presumably too "opportunistically" accommodating to bourgeois
leadership and to President Sukarno, does some violence to the
historical record, certainly insofar as Aidit was concerned. It was,
after all, Aidit who anticipated criticism that collaboration with
the bourgeoisie in the "pro-people" dynamics of the state might
work to the party's and Indonesia's ultimate disadvantage. For in
his Peking rally speech of September 4, 1963 (a speech deemed
sufficiently pure doctrinally to be disseminated in English
translation by Peking's Foreign Languages Press, it may be
reiterated), Aidit said 16;
"Some comrades have asked: Are these progressive political
and economic plans not tricks used by the bourgeoisie to
deceive the working people? This is not a strange question.
But the point is that these progressive plans have come about
through the growth of the progressive forces which have
taken an active part in drawing them up . . . all the
progressive plans and measures adopted by the present
government are primarily the result of the struggle of
Indonesia's progressive forces. The fact that the whole nation
15. See, e.g., Aidit's essay, "Lahimja PKI dan Perkembangannja," pp. 423-426,
in Aidit's collected works, Pilihan Tulisan (Jajasan Pembaruan Djakarta, 1959),
vol. 1.
16. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the
Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit., p. 86, and D.N. Aidit Kibarkan Tinggi
Pandji Revolusi, op. cit., p. 69.
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has accepted the plan of the working class and its party
reflects the working class leadership in the revolution".
The culmination of the PKI's allegedly erroneous line under
Aidit, in the Indonesian Maoists' perception today, was the
party's participation in the Gestapu coup attempt. This participation resulted from overconfidence in the party's strength (a "leftist
tendency," according to the otokritik), and from an "exaggeration
of the results of the people's struggle," which led the PKI
leadership in the course of 1965 to believe, according to the party's
forty-fifth anniversary thesis, in a "ripening revolutionary
situation" in the country. 17 Whether the Maoist perception is the
right one, and the PKI, in fact, had become overconfident in its
strength as a result of Sukamo's seemingly ever more militant
foreign policies as domestic economic chaos deepened, may well
long be argued. The point to note here, however, is that the
Indonesian Maoists (and indeed their pro-Soviet opponents in the
Indonesian Communist movement as well) concede direct PKI
involvement in the attempted Gestapu coup. The readiness with
which Indonesian Communists of whatever hue admit such
involvement seems at variance from the position of some Western
academic commentators on the Gestapu affair who appear to seek
to minimize PKI involvement as much as possible, or else assert
that the party was somehow duped into participation in the
attempted coup. 18 In contrast, the otokritik asserts, for example,
that as a result of their overconfident "adverturism," the PKI
leaders "easily involved themselves" in the Gestapu conspiracy. 1 9
The presumed author of the otokritik, former Politburo member
Sudisman, according to his trial record published in a Communist
journal, excluded the PKI as such from culpability for the coup
attempt; yet he added that in respect of Gestapu "all actions were
executed by individuals who happened to be members ofthe PKI,"
and that, moreover, the aims of the coup planners and "the
objectives of the 30th September movement were correct." 20
17. Tesis 45 Tahun PKI, 23 Mei 1920-23 Mei 1965 (Jajasan Pembaruan,
Djakarta 1965) p. 15. Parts of this thesis are cited in Build the PKI Along MarxistLeninist Line, op. cit., pp. 160-161.
18. For various views of Gestapu see by J.M. van der Kroef, "Interpretations of
the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature," Pacific Affairs, Winter
1970-71, pp. 557-577, and "Origins of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and
Alternatives," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, September 1972, pp. 277-298.
19. Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., p. 88.
20. "Sudisman Against Treason," Tricontinental, July-August, 1968, no. 7, pp.
18-19. Tricontinental is self-described as the "theoretical organ of the Executive
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Inter alia, one notes also that in the most authoritative selfevaluation that has thus far been published by the PKI-Moscow
faction one reads that the coup attempt aimed at establishing "a
state power that would be a harbinger of a people's democracy,"
and a spokesman of that faction, writing in the main international organ of Moscow-oriented Communist parties, has reiterated that the aim of the Gestapu movement was to bring together
Indonesian nationalists, Muslims and Communists in a "Revolutionary Council" which would be "a preliminary to People's
Democracy. " 21
While, even so, the extent of PKI participation in the coup (as
distinct from the PKI having participated at all) is likely to
remain controversial in various quarters, for the Indonesian
Maoists, as for their "revisionist," Moscow-oriented opponents,
Gestapu marked the inevitable climax of doctrinal errors and selfcompromising tactics which, in the Maoist perception, the PKI
pursued for better than a decade and a half, and which, in turn,
stemmed also from the failure of Indonesia's August 1945
Revolution.
Since the publication of the September 1966 otokritik,
authoritative statements of the Indonesian Maoists have reasserted the failure of the August 1945, Revolution, and of the PKI
erroneous line in the next decade and a half under Aidit's
leadership, as something given - a defined doctrinal position no
longer in need of further explanation, but only in need of constant
affirmation in policy pronouncements. Thus, in the words of one
Indonesian delegate to an Albanian trade union congress in 1967,
the Indonesian workers and people, having failed to "take the
correct road in their revolution," i.e., "they took the peaceful
road," now must suffer "the bitter consequences," and will have to
undergo "untold hardships," for experience has shown that
"taking the peaceful road is tantamount to taking the road to
suicide" and defeat. 22 During the 1951-65 period, one reads in a
1970 editorial in the Indonesian Maoists' main journal, that the
Secretariat of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and
Latin America," headquartered in Havana. Sudisman's statement, according to a
note by Tricontinental's editors, came to them "thanks to honorable people" who
were present at Sudisman's trial.
21. To Brothers at Home and Comrades Abroad, op. cit. (see note 3) p. 38;
Suchahyo, "The 'New Order' in Indonesia," World Marxist Review, 1967 vol. 10,
no. 10, p. 47.
22. Setiati Surasto, ''The Peaceful Road is the Suicidal Road," Indonesian
Tribune, April-May 1970.
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PKI leadership pursued a path of "Right opportunism," while,
simultaneously, "revisionist" influence made itself felt in their
party. This "opportunist-revisionist" tactic did immense harm to
the PKI, as well as to the course of the unfinished Indonesian
Revolution. The emergence of the Suharto "fascist regime" today,
is, again, viewed as directly linked to the erroneous party line of
the previous decade and a half. 23 In another editorial, in 1974, the
party's failure in the August 1945 Revolution and beyond is
considered in terms of control of state power. In other words, the
people, having seized in the revolution the "old state machinery,"
which did not meet the requirements of the revolution, nevertheless "never challenged" that machinery's "continued use," and so
did not replace it with an entirely new state power mechanism
that could serve the people's own revolutionary ends. Consequently, the "reactionaries" were able to play the role of a "Trojan
horse" and to undermine the Indonesian nation's revolutionary
course. 24 Such short categorical characterisations of Indonesia's
first twenty years of national revolution and independence (194565) are being repeatedly made in the Indonesian Maoist literature,
sometimes with an occasional embellishment of historic detail,
but always with an eye to providing an ideological rational for the
party's present predicament in Suharto's Indonesia, and for the
presumably new tactics which must be developed in order to
remedy Indonesia's present condition. Before considering these
new tactics, the plight of Indonesians and their country in the
present Suharto era, as the Maoists see it, must be briefly noted.
II.
"Fascist general Suharto ascended to power by way of a
counter-revolutionary coup d'etat- one which was backed by US
imperialism and directly masterminded by the CIA. No wonder
that the fascist regime he has set up in Indonesia has been
praised to the skies by world imperialism!" - so one reads in the
lead article of a recent publication of the "Indonesian Students'
Association in Albania." In the Maoists' dialectic vision, the
Suharto regime, as the present antithetical climax in Indonesia's
presumably ongoing revolution, is held to be exemplified by a
whole catalogue of deeply nefarious policies. There is, for example,
the allegedly continuing "selling out" by the Suharto government
23. Editorial, "Long Live The Communist Party of Indonesia," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, no. 2 p. 4.
24. Editorial, "Let Us Keep the Flames of the 1945 August Revolution Ablaze
- Punish and Smash the Traitors!" Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 3, p. 5.
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of Indonesia's natural resources to the "imperialism" of foreign
investors, particularly to the US. It is, however, not just the flow
of foreign investment (now nearly $4 billion) to Indonesia, or the
ever growing number of foreign enterprises in the country ("While
prior to Suharto's seizure of power in 1965 there were only three oil
companies operating in Indonesia, there are now 48, with US and
Japanese firms topping the list"), that arouse the Maoists' ire. It is
more especially also the opportunities presumably being provided
to nepotistic, rapacious, "Indonesian bureaucrat capitalists," who,
acting as fronts for foreign capital interests, continue to enrich
themselves. Thus, while President Suharto himself has no
business interests, "his wife Tien Suharto ... is a go-between for
foreign oil companies and the tourist business" acquiring "no
small" commissions for her services. There is, according to the
Indonesian Maoists, also Mme. Tien Suharto's "close criminal
relationship" with General lbnu Sutowo, the former directorgeneral of Indonesia's embattled, state-owned oil company
Pertamina, who has become "a financial prop for the survival of
fascist rule" and who, along with other Indonesian generals, is
accused of participating in various business enterprises with
foreign concerns, and so on. 25
In the Maoist perception, the economy of Suharto's Indonesia
has become the pawn of "imperialist" investment interests, and
the regime's national Five Year Development Plans merely serve
to widen the exploitative opportunities to these foreign monied
interests. Inevitably, in this view, the "rush of foreign capital" to
Indonesia has been accompanied by the immiseration of the
Indonesian masses, characterized, among others, by the bankruptcy of "large numbers" of domestic enterprises and a growing
mass unemployment for which supporting data are cited in the
Maoists' literature drawn from the Indonesian press itself. 26
Indonesian Maoist accounts are especially critical of the huge
loans and other aid extended by the so called Inter-Governmental
Group on Indonesia, or IGGI, a consortium composed of
Indonesia's major creditors and investors, among them the US,
Japan, and a number of Western European countries, as well as
international banking institutions like the World, Bank, the IMF
25. Preceding quotations from Api (API Pemuda Indonesai), Tirana, October
1972, pp. 1-2.
26. See, e.g., the "Delegation" of the PKI's Central Committee statement on
the occasion of the party's forty-ninth anniversary (May 23, 1969) in Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 3 (1969), no. 2, p. 42 and "Indonesia's Economy Further Deteriorates,"
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 4, p. 43.
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and the Asia Development bank. The nearly $8 billion pumped by
the IGGI into Indonesia since 1967 to stabilize and rehabilitate
the Indonesian economy after the Sukamo period, is criticized by
the Maoists, among other reasons, because of (1) the staggering,
even if long term, debt burden imposed on Indonesia because of
the IGGI assistance, thus tying its resources ever closer to the
capitalist bloc of nations and their economic policies, (2) the "open
door policy with regard to foreign capital" required of the Suharto
regime because of the IGGI arrangement (already in September,
1972 a total of $1.8 billion in foreign investment projects had been
approved, according to the Indonesian Maoists, and since then
that figure has grown), (3) the "dumping" of foreign commodities
"in immense quantities" on the Indonesian market, ranging from
cars to tooth-picks, (4) the special "tax holidays" granted by
Suharto to foreign investors, which, because of unfair advantage,
have pressed hard on national enterprises and which have led to
"steadily increasing" bankruptcies among them, (5) the requirement that projects built with IGGI aid utilize the services of
technicians and equipment purchased from the creditor country,
(6) that the food aid received from the US must be paid for at
prices usually higher than the world market price, and so on. 27
In a recent review of the Indonesian economy, the Indonesian
Tribune charged that under the_ Suharto regime rice prices had
skyrocketed 28 (e.g., by 20% in November, 1974 alone), but that
the increase had primarily benefited the "parasites' profiteering
interests" which are being protected by the present Indonesian
government. The general weakness of the Indonesian economy,
including the combined effects of recession and inflation in the
Western countries, is viewed by the Indonesian Maoists as a
primary reason for the new warmth in Soviet-Indonesian
relations. The attempts by Indonesia to secure increased Soviet
assistance will, however, but perpetuate the present "semi-colonial
and semi-feudal" character of Indonesian society. The reason for
this is that no important structural and policy changes have
occurred in the Suharto regime's policies. Thus the Soviets, to the
extent that they are assisting Indonesia, are not only perpetuating
the allegedly reactionary character of the present Indonesian
27. "The Suharto Regime and the IGGI Aid," Indonesian Tribune, Vol. 6, 1972,
No. 4, pp. 10-14. On August 16, 1975 Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik said that
Indonesia had received more than $3.7 billion in soft-term loans thus far, and that
nearly $2 billion in further soft-term loans had been promised.
· 28. "Behind Adam Malik's Visit to Moscow," pp. 19-21, and "Indonesian
Situation in 1974 Reviewed," p. 25, in Indonesian Tribune, vol. 9, no. 1, 1975.
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government, but, also, the new Soviet aid program to Indonesia is
likely to lead to "fiercer superpower contention" between American and Soviet competing interests. The Indonesian Maoists also
believe that under the circumstances the Soviet Union will
collaborate with the Indonesian government against "the Indonesian revolutionary movement." As a Third World country
Indonesia cannot possibly have any real interest in perpetuating
its own relationship with the Soviet Union. This is the message
which the Indonesian Maoists seek to articulate. The USSR thus
becomes but a participant in the current historic phase of
continuing colonial and feudal domination of the Indonesian
people. While the principal burden for all this rests upon the US, it
is clearly the Indonesian Maoists' intention to link Russian policy
toward Indonesia, and by implication in Southeast Asia as a
whole to American interests and designs.
Above all in the implementation of economic aid policies "US
imperialism," according to the Indonesian Maoists, has seen to it
that it has its Indonesian "trusted flunkeys" - a group of US
trained or sympathizing economists and public administrators jocularly referred to as the "Berkley Mafia"- in key positions, so
as to be able to keep Indonesia in America's "neo-colonial
clutches." 29 The effects of foreign economic influence, allegedly,
have been particularly harrowing for the mass of Indonesians.
For example, the "pillage" of fish resources of the Indonesian
seas, particularly by Japanese (who are also accused of "pillaging" the nation's oil resources) has destroyed the livelihood of
Indonesian fishermen; the "merciless rapine" of Indonesia's forest
resources by foreign timber firms (US, French and Japanese) who
have been given "three million hectares" in forest land concessions, according to the Maoists, gravely threatens small holders'
agriculture; and the impact of foreign capital, in any case, has not
benefited the peasantry, as vast imports of rice remain necessary
(e.g., in 1970 680,000 tons had to be imported) and frequent food
shortages and even famine keep breaking out. 30 National-capital
owned enterprises, e.g., textile mills and the cigarette industry,
unable to compete with foreign enterprises backed by corrupt'
officials and adverse business controls, increasingly face "ruina-

29. "On Suharto's Fascist Regime's Total Dependence on Imperialist 'Aids',"
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 1, pp. 13-17.
30 "Foreign Capital Brings the Indonesian People to Rack and Ruin,"
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 1, pp. 33-34.
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tion," and in turn aggravate the "massive unemployment" in the
country.at All the Suharto government's policies have done little
to stop the ruinous rate of inflation, which according to one
Indonesian Maoist analysis, is exemplified by the fact that in the
beginning of 1967 the price of rice was 10 Rupiah per kilogram
and by 1973 it had risen to 150 Rupiah, as, meanwhile, according
to official Indonesian sources cited in the Maoist publication, the
cost of living index rose in Indonesia by more than 20% during the
1972-73 period.a2
·
Given its tactical and doctrinal position, the PKI's Maoist
wing naturally has paid particular attention to the allegedly
worsening plight of the Indonesian peasantry over the years. The
Suharto regime is charged with permitting Indonesian landlords
"under the protection of the gun and bayonet" to "snatch back"
lands previously distributed to the peasant smallholders under
agrarian and land reform measures in vogue prior to 1965. Thus,
while in 1962-63, before Suharto assumed power, the average area
of land owned by the individual peasant was 0. 75 hectare, in 1972
that area had shrunk to only 0.25 hectare, and an estimated 7
million hectares of peasant land may be considered as having
been "grabbed by the regime of Suharto." Then, too, foreign
assistance projects in agriculture, such as expansion of irrigation
facilities and construction of dams, though requiring labor
services by the smallholder, ultimately primarily benefit the
landlord-landowner. The rural laborer's wages remain abysmally
low (i.e., 8 US cents a day), and "large numbers of peasants" are
allegedly compelled under the Suharto regime even to perform
"unpaid" or "slave" labor in government rural development
projects, as well as in the transport of state property and of
commodities appropriated by "local fascist chieftains" engaged in
smuggling and bartering.aa
Finally, to complete this sketch of life in Suharto's Indonesia
as perceived by the Maoists, there is the alleged trampling of
political rights in the country today. The victory of the government's Golkar (from Golongan Karya of "Functional Group")
party in the parliamentary election of July 3, 1971, was achieved
only because, allegedly, the Suharto government could and did
resort to "every conceivable means - subtle secret, as well as
31. Ibid. p. 35.
32. API (API Pemuda Indonesia), 1973 (no volume or issue number), pp. 4-5.
33. Adhiguna, "Notes on Ruthless Fleecing of Indonesian Peasants," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 3, pp. 11-12.
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crude and violent" in ensuring Golkar's success at the polls.
Coercion, threats and intimidation, amplified through the use of
the whole public administrative apparatus of the state and by
large sums of money, were routine government tactics, according
to the Maoists, and the Indonesian press itself, e.g., the Djakarta
daily Pedoman, is cited to buttress charges of "excesses" in the
government's campaign and of "violations of fundamental human
rights." 34 In a statement issued by the Maoist "Delegation" ofthe
PKI Central Committee, the Indonesian people were urged to
oppose the "farce" of the July 1971 elections and instead to
espouse "revolutionary armed struggle" as the only road to
national liberation. 35 Political repression in Indonesia, according
to the Maoists, is also exemplified by the periodic banning and
suspension of newspapers and by the arrests of journalists, so
that the remaining legal newspapers are forced "to use Aesopian
language" if they wish to criticize the government. 36
Last but not least, there is the problem of political prisoners
(estimated at over 300,000 in 1970 by one Maoist writer) who are
subjected to "horrifying atrocities and starvation" by the Suharto
regime. Indonesian Maoist sources particularly note that, also in
foreign quarters, there has been concern over the plight of some
10,000 political prisoners on the island of Buru, in Eastern
Indonesia. Buru has, in fact, become a "hell island," where
prisoners suspected of subversion, but against whom there is not
enough evidence to warrant a trial, are allegedly compelled into
forced labor and subject to a gruelling work routine with little
food. 37
What is one to make of this catalogue of horrors? A careful
consideration of the Maoists' charges, shorn of their exaggeration,
ideological jargon and hyperbole, reveals a hard nubbin of truth.
This is not the place to review the state of Indonesia's economy
and development planning since Suharto came to power in 1966.
However, one can note the range of non-Communist press and
34. "The 'General Election' A Boomerang for Suharto," Indonesian Tribune,
vol. 6, 1972, no. 3, pp. 8-10.
35. "Statement of the Delegation of PKI Central Committee. People of
Indonesia Unite to Oppose Suharto Fascist Regime's 'General Election' Farce,"
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 2, pp. 7-9.
36. "Is There a Free Press in Indonesia?," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 7, 1973, no.
3-4, pp. 21-22.
37. T. Amirun, "The Death-Concentration Camps of Buru Island," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, no. 1, pp. 13-16 and "Fascist Barbarity Coated with Cloak of
'Humanitarianism'," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 1, pp. 18-20.
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other reports in recent years stressing the serious corruption in the
grievous inequalities in the income and benefits flowing from
Suharto's "new order." 3B The Indonesian press itself, in editorial
comments, has noted that "the fact is that poverty is still a main
characteristic feature of our people, but a small group of them live
extravagantly"; that the "monthly income of the majority of the
people as revealed by Minister Suatami ... is below Rp 7000 or
US $17.00; and that "What one sees today, however, is the revival
of the old corrupt mentality as manifested by the prevalence of
corrupt practices, abuses of authority, extravagances by the 'elite
of society,' and poverty among the majority." 39 One authoritative
report in May 1975 on Indonesia's economy also notes next to
some bright spots in long-term development projects that:
"Unemployment is rampant. Incomes are woefully inadequate.
The nation's wealth is unevenly distributed; a recent oil bonanza
still has to create meaningful changes in the living standards of
its 130 million people,'' and also that while the catastrophic
inflation rate of 650% in 1965-66 was reduced to less than 10% in
the early 1970's, today "price indices are flying high again on two
digit figures." 40 The expropriation of the country's economic·
assets by "foreign business interests," while benefits to Indonesians are "confined to a small governing elite,'' is acknowledged
by non-Indonesian commentators to be a source of concern among
Indonesians, especially the students, and it is noteworthy that
after intense student protests in Djakarta on January 15 and 16,
1974 against Japanese but also other foreign economic power
interests, the Suharto government promulgated various measures
favoring the enterprises of indigenous Indonesians. 41
Then, too, the plight of the Indonesian peasant smallholder
has been repeatedly stressed by non-Communist sources, although
the latter observe different causes of the rural misery than are
found in the Maoist literature. The decline in the size of
38. "Corruption Angers Indonesian Students," The New York Times, January
22, 1974; "In Indonesia, Luxury Amid Poverty," The New York Times, January 27,
1974; "In Indonesia Wealth Flows In but Masses Don't Get Much of It," The Wall
Street Journal, February 26, 1974; "Corruption Saps the Vitality of Oil Rich
Indonesia," The Bangkok Post, June 30, 1975.
39. Editorials, The Djakarta Times, November 14 and 27, 1973.
40. "Indonesia: Coping with the Past and the Present," Insight (Hong Kong)
May 1975, p. 28.
41. Quarterly Economic Review: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Indonesia
(London) no. 1, 1974, p. 2, and "lndonesianisation and Wider Participation of
Indigenous Indonesians in Enterprises," Monthly Review (Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Djakarta), January-February, 1974, pp. 4-11.
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landholdings, owing to steady population pressure, is as demonstrable as the deepening peasant poverty, and the steady growth
of a rural proletariat in Java has now reached the point, in the
view of one observer, where ''literally thousands of landle2s
families crisscross the Javanese countryside, following the
harvest from West to East and then returning for the next season
as the paddy (rice) starts to yellow on the fields agains" 42 - a
clear worsening of what the present writer has called Java's
"scavenger economy." Whatever the achievements in economic
stabilization of the Suharto government, deepening rural poverty
is a reality in Indonesia, and the Indonesian Maoists' tactical
focus on the peasant and rural proletariat cannot be faulted.
Finally, in the area of political liberties the charges of the
Maoists, despite their verbal rhodomontades, are also basically
correct. The July 1971 election may not have been a "farce," but
independent observers and even highly placed officials in the
Suharto government itself have conceded extensive intimidation
and coercion oi Golkar's opponents, numerous pressures on the
civil bureaucracy, and, to ensure the success of the government's
party candidates, extensive use of the financial and public
administrative r~sources of the state on behalf of the Golkar, and
so on. 43 The condition of the press to be sure is, in reality, a good
deal more free than Maoist criticism makes it out to be.
Nevertheless, dailies are frequently suspended, journalists are
hailed before the authorities, certain newspapers known to reflect
the Golkar or armed forces' position are facilitated in their
circulation through government agencies, especially in the islands
beyond Java, and the relative lack of press freedom in Indonesia
has been the object of official concern by international journalistic
and press bodies. And while the living condition of the political
prisoners on Buru island has greatly impr:>ved over the years,
that of those being held in other priso.:tl3 (all said to be
42. Richard William Franke, The :;reen Revolution in a Javanese Village
(unpublished Ph D. thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., June 1972), p.
181. Also cited in William L. Collier et al., Tebasan HYV's and Rural Change: An
Example in Java (Agro Economic Survey of Indonesia s. 1, November 1973
mimeo), pp. 2-3. See also William Collier, Villagers' Employment, Sources of
Income, Use of High Yielding Varieties and Ji'arm Laborers in the Major RiceProducing Regions of Indonesia (Agro Economic Survey s. 1, June 1972), and D.H.
Penny and S. Singarimbun, Population and Poverty in Rural Java: Some
Economic Arithmetic from Sriharjo (Department of Agricultural Economics,
Cornell University, May, 1973).
43. See, e.g., B.B. Hering and G.A Willis, The Indonesian General Election of
1971 (Centre d'Etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de I' Extreme Orient, Brussels, 1973).
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Communists or Gestapu participants or supporters) has not, and
the fact remains, as an international non-Communist organisation concerned with the problem of political prisoners has noted,
that in 1974 over 55,000 political prisoners were still being held in
Indonesia "all detained without charge or trial since 1965."44 The
Suharto government, because of increasing concern from nonCommunist quarters throughout the world, has shown considerable sensitivity to the problem of the prisoners, thousands of whom
the government in fact admits cannot be brought to trial because
of insufficient evidence, yet keeps on holding in custody presumably for "rehabilitation." Again, in focusing their criticism of the
Suharto regime in terms of the prisoner issue the Indonesian
Maoists are keeping a wide, including non-Communist company
throughout the world.
Considered tactically, then, the Maoists have chosen their
targets well in their attacks on the Suharto regime. This is not
however, the same thing as saying that the method of attack, i.e.,
the particular verbal rationale accompanying or sustaining the
attack,. would find the same broad-gauge or international
adhesion. Nor does it mean that the Indonesian Maoist analysis
observes any objectivity or balance, since it denies that there are
or excludes from consideration any positive features of the
Suharto administration. It does mean, however, that Indonesian
Maoists, in developing their criticism of Suharto's domestic
policies, have sharply focused on generally agreed upon points of
vulnerability of the present Indonesian government. The same
cannot be said, however, of the Indonesian Maoist assessments of
the Suharto regime's foreign policies. Compared to the relative
tactical realism of their attacks in the domestic sphere, Indonesian Maoist analysis of Indonesia's current international relations appears to have totally surrendered to ideological preconceptions, ignoring the flexibility and self-searching pragmatism not
just of the Djakarta government, but also that of its Southeast
Asian neighbors in this post-Vietnam war and big power detente
era.
Insofar as Indonesian foreign policy is concerned, the Maoist
literature and policy positions appear to revolve - next to routine
praise for and congratulatory statements sent to "fraternal"
parties like the Chinese and Albanian parties, or to the Malaysian
insurgents or the Peking-oriented wing of the Philippine Communist party - around three issues, all essentially dealing with the
44. Amnesty International Annual Report, 1973-74 (published by Amnesty
International, London, 1974), p. 52.
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role of three big powers, the USSR, the US, and PRC. References
to Japan do appear, but primarily in the context of its "imperialist" economic expansion in Southeast Asia. References to the
global J:"ole of Western Europe are non-existent, and there has thus
far appeared relatively little (and that little is usually negative) on
the growth of Southeast Asian regionalism, on a possible
"neutralization" of Southeast Asia, or on the future of ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded in 1967, and
comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the
Philippines).
Paramount in the Indonesian Maoist literature are the
allegedly aggressive Soviet policies toward Indonesia. Although
virtually all independent observers agree that in the aftermath of
the Gestapu incident and the subsequent execution of suspected
Communist leaders in Indonesia, Soviet-Indonesian relations
became notably strained - a strain aggravated by Indonesia's
huge $990 million debt to the Soviets at about the time of the
Gestapu incident45 - and only in the last three years have begun
to improve again, in the Indonesian Maoist perception Russian
policies have, since the advent of the Suharto regime in 1966, been
designed to "give a shot in the arm" to Sukarno's successors,
described by Maoists as "those murderers of thousands of
Indonesian patriots and innocent people." 46 According to this
perception, the USSR has supplied arms and ammunition to the
Suharto regime, attempted to enhance its own trade opportunities
with the regime from its inception, and even tried to build "a
somewhat anti-imperialist image of the fascist regime" of Suharto
by portraying that regime as being reluctant to follow US policies.
The concept of US-USSR collusion in developing aggressive
policies in Asia was particularly explored in 1969 in one
Indonesian Maoist publication. There it was charged that the
Nixon Doctrine, L'lsofar as Asia was concerned, meant primarily a
variant of the old Dullesian line of letting "Asians fight Asians,"
and that it, like the Soviets' proposed collective security system for
Asia, served primarily the purpose of encircling the PRC. 47
Particularly recurrent in the Maoist literature has been the
theme that through their "revisionist splitting" policies in the
45. J. Panglaykim and H.W. Arndt, The Indonesian Economy, Facing A New
Era? (Rotterdam University Press, 1966), p. 12, Table 1.
46. R. Djuwari, "Soviet Policy Toward Indonesia. More Insidious than US
Policy," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 2, 1968, no. 6-7, p. 17-19.
47. "US Imperialist-Soviet Social Imperialist Plot of Aggression in Asia,"
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 4, pp. 26-28, 41.
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Indonesian "Revolutionary movement," through projecting the
false image of a Chinese threat to Indonesia, and through
attempts to portray the Suharto "fascist regime" as "antiimperialist" and "neutral," the Soviets persist in helping Suharto,
as, meanwhile, they also "peddle" their "revisionist prescription
of suicide" to the Indonesian people that Indonesians should
pursue a peaceful and parliamentary course. 48
The new Sino-US detente in the Nixon era and the winding
down of overt US military commitments in Indo-China, have done
little or nothing to change the Indonesian Maoist perception of the
US "imperialist" threat in Asia generally and in Indonesia in
particular. Attacks on SEATO (the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization) and on US mutual defense policies have continued
over the years in the Indonesian Maoist publications, although
SEATO's recent decline is noted even as the continuing similarity
between US "imperialism" and Soviet "social imperialism" is
underscored. ASEAN is placed in the same category as SEATO
and ANZUS (the US-Australian-New Zealand mutual defense
treaty) as being but another "military pact" that was "concocted"
by the US, but that now is "crumbling."
According to the Indonesian Maoist perception, it is the PRC
that is the principle bastion of the "peoples and nations of the
whole world" against the allegedly subversive and hegemony
seeking policies of the two "superpowers," the US and the USSR. 49
This position must obviously qualify the extent to which the
Indonesian Maoists are prepared to endorse the thaw between the
PRC and the US since the inception of the Nixon era. Since the
PRC, de facto, is relying on the US as a "potential balancer" in
the relations of the superpowers, the alleged alliance between
Soviet "social imperialism" and American "imperialism" cannot
be pushed too far. The way out of this dilemma at least for the
Indonesian Maoists is not to attack Sino-US detente, but rather to
attack the vestigal influences exercised by the US in Thailand, the
Philippines and increasingly more directly in Indonesia. Both
SEATO, formally to fade out of existence before the middle of
1977, and American's support, tacitly but real, of the ASEAN
strategic potential serve the Indonesian Maoists as a convenient
whipping post. It thus becomes possible to continue to attack the
lingering American military presence in Asia while not criticizing
48. "Soviet Social·lmperialists Exert Tremendous Efforts to Prop Up Suharto
Fascist Regime," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 2, pp. 10-15.
49. Peking Review, July 30, 1976, p. 23.
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the role which that presence plays in China's own strategic
posture toward the Soviet Union. To the extent that it is possible
to link the Suharto regime with the lower profile American
military policy in Asia, today it serves the Indonesian Maoists
interests to continue to attack Washington style "imperialism"
also.
Even as the PRC was gradually moving toward qualified
endorsement of the concept originally advanced by the ASEAN
powers in 1971 that the Southeast Asian region be declared a
"zone of peace, freedom and neutrality," free from the interference
of other powers, the Indonesian Maoists were denouncing that
ideal as but a "new veil" behind which US "imperialism" and its
"puppets," like the Suharto government, would seek to continue
their machinations. 50 Suharto's neutrality and non-alignment
claims have been particularly excoriated in the Indonesian Maoist
media "unneutral neutrality," as it is put), and while, eventually,
a less openly anti-ASEAN position may well be adopted by those
media, yet so long as the present freeze in Sino-Indonesian
diplomatic relations between Peking and Djakarta persists
(relations were suspended, though not fc:1mally broken in 1967, in
the wake of rising tensions between the two countries following
the Gestapu incident), Suharto's professed adherence to ASEAN
policy aims of neutrality is likely to be attacked. The keynote of
this Indonesian Maoist approach became again apparent in 1972,
in a comment in the Indonesian Tribune on recent discussions
between Suharto and Japanese special envoy Kiichi Aichi in
Djakarta. These discussions were designed to brief the Indonesian
government on the irr.pending "normalization" of Sino-Japanese
diplomatic relations. The Tribune's comment took note of the
allegedly anti-Chinese remarks made by Suharto at the time of the
Aichi visit and went on to criticize the Suharto's government's
"utter isolation" in world affairs ("in the same category as the
Chiang Kai-shek bandit clique, Park Jung-Hee and the more diehard Latin American dictators"), since other nations had
recognized that the PRC could not be ignored, and that no
international problem could be solved without her. 5 1 The Tribune's
comment also repudiated what has, in fact, been a frequent theme
in official Indonesian statements on relations with Peking, i.e.,
that the PRC is continously meddling in internal Indonesian
50. "Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 4, p. 14.
51. "Suharto's Anti-China Policy Reveals his Regime's Utter Isolation,"
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 4, p. 14.
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affairs, including aiding subversives. According to the Tribune,
the PRC has always been guided in its foreign relations by the
principle of peaceful coexistence and has never interfered in the
affairs of others. However, China "will faithfully uphold forever"
the principle of support for liberation struggles all over the world,
and hence "Suharto had better cast off his idle dream that China
can be deterred from upholding this sacred principle."52
As for the US, the pattern of its dominance in Suharto's
Indonesia is considered to be total, according to the Maoists; in
fact, Indonesia today is a "new type colony of US imperialism."
Through joint investment with the Japanese, whose "growing
economic expansionism in Indonesia" cheats Indonesian business, bankrupts national monetary institutions, and dominates
Indonesian marketing, the US is seen as forging strong shackles
on Indonesian mining, on the development of fishing resources
and sea transport, and on agriculture. All the natural resources of
Indonesia, according to the Maoists, are being handed over by
Suharto to foreign capital, "particularly that of US imperialism."53 America is also committing "cultural aggression in
Indonesia"; e.g. the Asia Society, a "Rockefeller owned private
firm," is charged with shipping Indonesian art treasures to New
York with the connivance of "Suharto and his fascist Minister of
Culture," as meanwhile the CIA is hiring "many reactionary men
of letters"; "reactionary" shadow-play artists are allegedly under
orders from Suharto to present plays that defend "feudal
oppression and exploitation." Higher education in Indonesia "has
practically been affiliated to the American universities," and
many of Suharto's officials are "all the offspring of American
education." 54
Militarily and in international relations Suharto is accused by
the Maoists of putting his armed forces "at the service of the
'Nixon Doctrine,' " an apparent quid pro quo for the flow of US
military equipment and supplies to the Indonesian services.
Characteristic of Suharto's subservience, according to the Maoist
view, is that "within days after US imperialism carried out
aggression against Cambodia" (an apparent reference to the fall
of the government of Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970) the
52. Ibid.
53. "Indonesia - A New Type of Colony of U.S. Imperialism," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 1. pp. 20-25, and "Growning Japanese Economic
Expansionism in Indonesia," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 1, p. 13-17.
54. Arita, "US Imperialist Cultural Aggression in Indonesia," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, no. 1, pp. 22-23.
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Suharto government recognized the new Lon Nol government
"and secretly sent a shipload of arms to Phnompenh." Subsequently, it is charged, Indonesia began giving military training to
Lon Nol's military. Then, too, "acting upon the instructions of US
imperialism," Indonesia is vigorously attempting to transform
ASEAN into an Asian version of SEAT0. 55 At the mid-1974
Caracas conference of the United Nation on the Law of the Sea,
Suharto officials by stressing the so-called acrhipelago principle
(wawasan nusantara), whereby all the seas and waterways
between the Indonesian islands are considered as falling within
Indonesian territorial control, in fact attempted to safeguard the
seabed and fishing interests already "pawned to and parceled out
by foreign monopolies." 56
This overdrawn and highly schematized picture of Indonesia's current diplomacy ignores all the complexities of Indonesia's
regional position, for example, its mediation efforts between
Malaysia and the Philippines in the dispute over Sabah, or in the
South Philippine Muslim uprising. It overlooks Djakarta's often
unaasy realtionship with Japan, or the seemingly perpetual
sanguinity of Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik that a
normalization of Sino-Indonesian relations is but a matter of time,
or, again, Indonesia's relations with the Middle Eastern and West
European countries where China itself has friendly interests.
Ignoring all these, then, in their foreign policy analyses, suggests
that the Indonesian Maoists probably do not perceive the same
significant tactical opportunities in the pragmatic pattern of the
Suharto regimes international policies as in its domestic affairs.
The Maoists are apparently preoccupied with changing Indonesia's "state power" through domestic tactics. With these tactics,
that is, with the party's present tasks and the road it seeks to
follow in changing Indonesia's government and society we may
now be briefly concerned.
III.
"The way out" for Indonesia of its present problems,
according to the earlier mentioned September 1966 otokritik of the
Indonesian Maoists, is to raise and follow "three banners." The
first banner is the building of a truly Marxist-Leninist party that
is free from modern "revisionism," opportunism, and "subjecti55. "Suharto Puts his Army at the Service of the 'Nixon Doctrine',"
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 2, pp. 24-26.
56. "The Caracas Conference and Suharto's Hypocrisy," Indonesian Tribune,
vol. 8, 1974, no. 3, p. 17.
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vism." The second is espousal of "the armed people's struggle,"
the heart of which is the armed struggle of the peasantry in the
context of and antifeudal revolution that is led by the "working
class." Third, there is the need to build the "revolutionary united
front," which is founded on the alliance between peasants and
workers and, again, is led by the working class. 57
In a number of subsequent statements the Indonesian Maoists
have elaborated these three major tactics. In November 1967, for
example, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Maoist PKI published a new program for the party. This new
program emphasizes that "only through people's war" can the
Indonesian people achieve their "liberation," and hence Indonesians must arm themselves and build a "people's armed force".
The standard Maoist prescription of using a rural revolutionary
base against the counter revolutionary cities is also offered here,
and with the peasantry as the core of their forces the proposed
Indonesian people's army" is directed to win victories "locality by
locality" in the countryside, encircle the towns, and ultimately
"liberate" the latter. The building of the "backward Indonesian
villages" into "advanced" revolutionary base areas, according to
this 1967 party program, is not only an urgent task for every
Communist, but also for "every son and daughter of the
Indonesian people" aspiring to free the nation. Building the
united front means, therefore, also utilizing the potential of "all
revolutionary classes and groups," not just the workers and the
peasants but also the petty bourgeoisie (described as a "reliable
ally" of the working class) and the "vacillating" national
bourgeoisie. 58
Again, in a statement by the "delegation" of Maoist PKI
Central Committee, on the occasion of the party's fiftieth
anniversary in 1970, the peasantry is extolled as the "most
trusted" ally of the proletariat, and the PKI's past record in
appreciating this role of the peasantry is decried. According to
this statement it is "true" that during the 1951-65 period the PKI
"formulated" that the peasantry was the main force of the
Revolution, and that the "working class" had to establish an
alliance with it. However, it is alleged, despite this formulation,
that the PKI in practice did not encourage the peasants to develop
57. Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., p. 199.
58. "The Programme of the Communist Party of Indonesia for People's
Democracy in Indonesia (November 1967)," pp. 235·280, in Build the PKI Along the
Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit.
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their armed struggle, establish revolutionary bases in the country,
or struggle for political power. Therefore, today, the PKI must give
new leadership to the rural masses, and only by relying on the
peasantry, particularly on the working and poor peasants, can the
PKI and the proletariat lead the peasants "in a protracted guerilla
struggle." 59 Apropos the above critique, one might perhaps
observe in passing that D.N. Aidit, the PKI's major executive and
theoretician during most of the now criticized 1951-65 period,
acknowledged the peasantry, especially the poor peasants, to be
"the biggest force driving the revolution onward," and urged the
peasants to undertake militant "unilateral actions" (aski se{ihak),
including the forceable seizing of land from landlords in 1964.
Nevertheless, admittedly, there is controversy as to whether
subsequently Aidit wholly conformed to the Sukarno regime's
pressures for moderation, or, indeed, had, or had not, embarked on
a final drive to seize power in Indonesia. 60
In keeping with the Maoists' doctrinal emphasis on the
necessity of violent struggle, relatively obscure clashes have been
singled out in the Indonesian Maoist media as landmarks in the
developing "people's war" in the country and thus as models to be
emulated for future action. An attack on the small Indonesian
military air base at Singkawang, West Kalimantan (Borneo)
province on July 17, 1967, by about fifty Communist insurgents,
some Indonesians and others from Sarawak's previously mentioned "North Kalimantan People's Guerilla Forces," is now
described as the "successful first shot against the facist military
regime" of Suharto. From this the armed struggle is said to have
spread to other islands of Indonesia. Describing the nature of this
supposedly developing "people's" struggle, one Indonesian Maoist
account said that6 1 :
"The base of operations for the people's armed forces usually
lies in the mountainous districts. In many villages guerilla
detachments and self-defense corps have been organised.
59. "People of Indonesia Unite Under the Leadership of the Communist Party
of Indonesia Surmount Every Difficulty and Continue to March Forward
Courageously Along the Road of Armed Revolution," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 4,
1970, no. 2, pp. 6-13.
60. Cf. D.N. Aidit's essay, "Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia,"
pp. 292-293, in his Collected Works, Pilihan Tulisan, op. cit., vol. 2. On the
controversy over the PKI's militancy, see J.M. van der Kroef, "Origins of the 1965
Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and Alternatives," Journal of Southeast Asian
Studies, September 1972, pp. 277-298.
61. "Singkawant- Brilliant Episode in the Armed Struggle of the Indonesian
People," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 3, pp. 3-6.
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Young men and women from among the masses of farm
laborers and poor peasants form the bulk of these forces. In
some villages guerilla detachments consisting solely of
women fighters have been formed .... In villages around
Tjileduk, West Java, the masses of peasants burning with
class hatred, have executed a number of exceptionally
notorious landlords. In other places of West Java, at about
the same time, the peasants organised themselves and
launched the struggle to win back their lands which were
grabbed by reactionary authorities and landlords."
The foregoing account was published in 1968. The Tjileduk
incident and some like it did, in fact, take place in various
localities in Java. But today the "brilliant" example of the
Singkawang episode is being emulated only by about 200 badly
disorganised Maoist insurgents operating mostly in Sarawak's
interior and frontier zones, while in Indonesian West Kalimantan
or in other Indonesian islands, the "people's war" is at present
largely a rhethorical conceit.
Despite the insurgents' obvious inability to confront effectively the Suharto government's currently extensive police powers
and security apparatus, the Maoist "Delegation" of the PKI's
Central Committee unceasingly emphasizes the dangers in
following the "peaceful" road, the "Parliamentary road." Such a
"parliamentary" path it ascribes, not surprisingly, to the Moscoworiented PKI undergrounds and exiles, accusing them of seeking
to attain a new legal status for the party in the context of a future
"national democratic" government. One such accusation has had
a particular reference to a 1969 policy statement of the ProMoscow group called "Urgent Tasks of the Communist Movement
in Indonesia," which, in tum, included an attack on the Maoists'
1966 otokritik. In the "Urgent Tasks" document of the Moscow
oriented PKI group "new tactics" are called for, to be based on the
principle that "it would be premature to launch armed action
before the completion of the painstaking revolutionary work of a
preparatory nature" and before the emergence of a "clea:cut
revolutionary crisis." To be sure, "military cadres" must also be
assembled, and secret weapons caches must be prepared for
eventual "armed action," but all this must be done along with
"political work among the masses," for without a "mass political
arm" an armed rising would not be effective. The rehabilitation
and restoration of the PKI among the masses, in particular, is
thus an essential first step. The basic strategy for Communists to
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follow, according to the "Urgent Tasks" statement, is to work in
favor of a change in the "balance of political forces" in favor of
the working people, "so that an anti-imperialist democratic
national government" can be established. 6 2
The significance of "national democracy" (and its offshoots
and variations like "new democracy" and "people's democracy")
as a tactic used by Communist parties, including the Chinese,
toward completion of an eventual "socialist" revolution need not
here be emphasized. 5 3 There is little question that in other parts of
Southeast Asia today, e.g., in the Philippines and Thailand, the
pro-Moscow Communist underground is also seeking to legitimize
itself in a new nationalistic context in the region where there is
diminished direct American influence and looming Soviet power,
by stressing its "peaceful" and parliamentary approach and its
identification with "left" or "progressive" intellectual circles, and
with other groups which for economic and political reasons are
similarly critical of the prevailing regime, thus contributing to
and hopefully benefiting from an eventual liberalization of that
regime. 64 Such an approach remains anathema to the Indonesian
Maoists, however. The advocacy of the "parliamentary road" and
of the "national democratic" tactic not only sidetracks the
revolution of Indonesia itself, in the Maoist view, but further
enables the Soviet "social imperialists" to continue their economic
collaboration with the Suharto regime and with US imperialism
generally. The power that is sought by the PKI, in the "Urgent
Tasks" document according to the Indonesian Maoists, is
therefore merely the perpetuation of bourgeoisie power. 65 "National democracy" as a tactical concept thus seems conceptually
linked by the Indonesian Maoists to the period of "revisionism" in
the PKI, when the party was led by Aidit in the 1950's and early
1960's, and when the PKI's alleged accommodation of "bourgeois"
interests led to its Gestapu debacle.
Even so, in the building of the "revolutionary united front," as
required by the otokritik's "third banner" directive, the Indonesian Maoists have an appreciative eye for new revolutionary
62. "Urgent Tasks of the Communist Movement in Indonesia," Information
Bulletin, 1969, no. 7 (143), pp. 23-42.
63. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "On National Democracy," Survey (London),
April 1963, pp. 134-145, and "The Communist Concept of National Democracy,"
Studies on the Soviet Union, vol. 4, 1964, no. 2, pp. 39-63.
64. See, e.g., Justus M. van der Kroef, "Philippine Communist Theory and
Strategy. A New Departure?," Pacific Affairs, Summer 1975, pp. 181-198.
65. "Expose Modem Revisionists' New Plot to Split the PKI," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, pp. 35-37.
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social potentials. Even before the violent, largely student-led
demonstrations in Djakarta in mid-January 1974, during the visit
of Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka, Indonesian Maoist statements had underscored the economic plight of Indonesian
students ("swelling ranks of the diploma-holding unemployed"),
as at the same time the cost of advanced education in Indonesia
allegedly was said to be placing it beyond the reach of all but the
wealthier parents. 66 Mter the January 1974 incident, which
Maoist media described as reflecting the "discontent of the broad
masses of the people" toward the Suharto regime's policies of
submission of the Indonesian economy to US and Japanese
imperialism, special emphasis was placed on the role of the
"masses of students and youth," who, along with the rest of the
Indonesian people, would surely "sum up their experiences,"
discredit unworthy leaders, and strongly commit themselves to
the cause of liberation. 67 While, on the one hand, this emphasis on
the important role of students and youth in Indonesia is in
keeping with similar stress on the importance of the revolutionary
activism of youth to be found in current Communist party
directives in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, on the other
hand the volatile nature of youth action (after all students during
1965-67 spearheaded the downfall of President Sukamo under
whose policies the PKI reached its greatest expansion and
influence in its history) must give some pause - never more so
than to theorists familiar with the "summing up" of the Chinese
party and its experiences in the "Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution".
Ultimately, therefore, the building of a disciplined party,
"armed with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung Thought," indeed
a party whose members are committed to studying "assiduously"
Mao Tse-Tung Thought as "the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the
present era," remains the most important and "first banner"
which the Indonesian Communists can raise. The correct
ideological training of such a party, its strict but smoothly
functioning hierarchy, the need for all party members to reject
firmly all appeals of "revisionism" and opportunism that may
sway them from their revolutionary course - these, at bottom, are
the indispensible conditions of the Indonesian Communist
movement's revival today, as the Maoists see it. The Indonesian
66. Karman, "Student Resistance Against the Fascist Regime," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 2, pp. 12-14.
67. "People of Indonesia Unite to Win Democracy and Liberty!," Indonesian
Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 2, p. 5.
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environment today offers a challenge and a promise to the party
in this respect, for what is happening in the nation (one reads in
another analysis) is an "extremely interesting" struggle ''between
well-fed and ill-fed dogs, between big dogs and small dogs." 68
While to outsiders a perception of Indonesia's internal problems is
perhaps not best expressed in terms of a canine conflict, existing
contradictions in the country are viewed by the Maoists as
"useful," and as affording an opportunity "to further promote" the
armed struggle to overthrow the Suharto government.
68. "The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists Rebuild Their Party with the Chinese
Communist Party as the Model," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, pp. 11-18, and
"A Fight Between Well-Fed Dogs and lll-Fed Dogs," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3,
1969, p. 42.
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